Hybrid dynamic systems include both continuous and discrete state variables. Properties of hybrid systems, which have an infinite state space, can often be verified using ordinary model checking together with a finite-state abstraction. Model checking can be inconclusive, however, in which case the abstraction must be refined. This paper presents a new procedure to perform this refinement operation for abstractions of hybrid systems. Following an approach originally developed for finite-state systems [1, 2] , the refinement procedure constructs a new abstraction that eliminates a counterexample generated by the model checker. For hybrid systems, analysis of the counterexample requires the computation of sets of reachable states in the continuous state space. We show how such reachability computations with varying degrees of complexity can be used to refine hybrid system abstractions efficiently. Examples illustrate our counterexample-guided refinement procedure and experimental results for a prototype implementation of the procedure indicate significant advantages over existing methods.
Introduction
Hybrid systems are formal models that include both continuous and discrete state variables. With the increasing use of hybrid systems to design embedded controllers for complex systems such as manufacturing processes, automobiles, and transportation networks, there is an urgent need for more powerful analysis tools, especially for safety critical applications. Tools developed so far for the automated analysis of hybrid systems are restricted to low-dimensional continuous dynamics [3] . The reason for this limitation is the difficulty of representing and computing sets of reachable states for continuous dynamic systems. Recent publications have proposed two general approaches to deal with the complexity of hybrid system analysis, namely modular analysis (e.g., [4, 5] ) and abstraction (e.g., [6, 7, 8] ). This paper focuses on the latter approach.
Abstraction maps a given model into a less complex model that retains the behaviors of interest [6] . In the context of hybrid system verification, abstraction transforms the inherently infinite state system into a finite-state model [7, 8] . Existing tools often do Definition 2 Abstraction. A transition system A = (Ŝ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê) with a finite set of statesŜ is an abstract model of a transition system C = (S, S 0 , E), denoted A C, if there exists an abstraction function α : S →Ŝ such that:
• the initial set isŜ 0 = α(S 0 ) = {ŝ 0 | ∃s 0 ∈ S 0 :ŝ 0 = α(s 0 )}, and
•Ê ⊇ α(E) = {(ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) | ∃s 1 , s 2 ∈ S : (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ E,ŝ 1 = α(s 1 ),ŝ 2 = α(s 2 )}.
Note: In general, it is possible-and sometimes desirable-to consider an abstraction relation α rather than a mere abstraction function. The work presented here can easily be adapted to this more general case, however for simplicity we shall stick to the above definition.
Sometimes the term simulation is used in the literature to describe the abstraction relation. In contrast to the definitions of abstraction in [1, 10] , Defn. 2 allows A to include spurious transitions, i.e., the setÊ may contain elements that do not correspond to transitions in C. Spurious transitions arise in the construction of abstractions of hybrid systems because in most cases sets of reachable states for continuous systems cannot be represented and computed exactly [9] .
Abstract models will be used to analyze properties of a given transition system. Throughout the paper, we will the given system C the concrete system.
In order to construct a more detailed model from a given abstract model, we define the following concept of model refinement. Properties (or specifications) are verified for the concrete model C using an abstract model A. In this paper we consider the verification of safety properties, defined as follows.
Definition 4
Safety. Given a transition system TS = (S, S 0 , E), let the set B ⊆ S \ S 0 specify a set of bad states. We say that TS is safe with respect to B, denoted by TS |= AG¬B iff there is no path in the transition system from an initial state in S 0 to a bad state in B. Otherwise we say TS is unsafe, denoted by TS | = AG¬B.
Definition 5 Counterexamples.
A path σ = (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s m ) of TS = (S, S 0 , E) with s m ∈ B is called a counterexample of TS with respect to the safety property TS |= AG¬B. Given a concrete transition system C, an abstract transition system A, and a counterexample σ in C, we say thatσ = (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 , . . . ,ŝ m ) is the corresponding abstract counterexample of the abstract system A, ifŝ i = α(s i ) holds for all i ∈ {0, . . . , m}. Given a counterexampleσ of A, σ is called a corresponding concrete counterexample if for all i, s i = α(s i ) and (s i , s i+1 ) ∈ E. If a counterexampleσ of A has no corresponding concrete counterexample for C,σ is called a spurious counterexample. If A |= AG¬B can be verified, it can immediately be concluded from Lemma 1 (i.e., without applying verification to the concrete system C) that C |= AG¬B. On the other hand, the converse of Lemma 1 with respect to the AG-property does not hold. If the verification of A reveals A | = AG¬B, then we cannot conclude that C is not safe with respect to B, since the counterexample for A may be spurious. We call a method that checks whether or not a counterexample is spurious a validation method. If the validation method discovers that the counterexample is spurious, then the counterexample is used to refine A. We now introduce a scheme for counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) to verify safety properties for a given concrete model. The basic principle is to repeat the following sequence of steps until the property is verified or refuted [1] . The starting point is a concrete model C and an abstract model A (we propose in Sec. 5.1 a specific way to obtain an initial abstract model for hybrid systems). The first step is then to analyze A | = AG¬B by model checking. If this property holds it can immediately be concluded from Lemma 1 that C is safe, too. Otherwise a counterexample is obtained, and we must verify whether it has a corresponding real counterexample in C. If so, then the safety property does not hold for C. Otherwise, i.e., when the counterexample is spurious, the counterexample is used to refine the model A. That is, a new and more detailed model A with C A A is produced, which excludes the spurious counterexample. The procedure of model checking, validation of the counterexample, and refinement of the abstract model is repeated until the safety property is proved or refuted for C. The pseudo-code in Fig. 1 The crucial steps in the CEGAR procedure are model checking, validation, and refinement. With respect to model checking, standard algorithms for AG-properties can be used [13] .
Lemma 1 Given a concrete model C = (S,
For validating a counterexample, the important ingredient is the computation of successors of states. We define an operator succ that determines the successor states from a given setS ⊆ S by succ(S) = {s ∈ S | ∃s ∈S : (s, s) ∈ E}. This set may not be exactly computable for a given concrete model C, i.e. only over-approximations succ(S) ⊃ succ(S) may be available. We first assume that succ(S) is computable.
A counterexampleσ = (ŝ 0 , . . . ,ŝ m ) of A is then validated as follows:
. . , m} denote the sets of concrete states corresponding to an element ofσ. The reachable parts of these sets are recursively defined by S reach 0
The counterexample is spurious iff S reach k = ∅ for at least one k, and we say the counterexample is refuted. Otherwise, the counterexample is validated, and B is reachable.
If the counterexample is refuted with S reach k = ∅, the model A is refined into a new finite abstract model A = (Ŝ ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê ) (cf. Defn. 3). The refined model should take into account that there are no concrete transitions from states in S reach k−1 to states in S k . We therefore require that the setÊ of A not contain transitions in the set {(α (s 1 ), α (s 2 )) | ∃ s 1 ∈ S reach k−1 , s 2 ∈ S k }. Thus, successive refined models will exclude previously explored counterexamples. A method for the refinement of abstract models for infinite-state systems will be presented in the next section.
Refinement of Abstract Models
This section presents a specific method for refining an abstract model A. The main idea is to directly use the information obtained from the validation procedure to refine certain abstract states. Assume that the abstract model includes a transition betweenŝ 1 and s 2 , while the validation of the counterexample has revealed that only a subset of concrete states in S 2 := α −1 (ŝ 2 ) is reachable from concrete states in S 1 := α −1 (ŝ 1 ). In this case we refine A by splittingŝ 2 into two new states. The first one, denoted byŝ . In addition, the abstraction function that maps concrete states to abstract ones also has to be refined.
Definition 6
State Splitting. Consider a concrete model C = (S, S 0 , E) and an abstract model A = (Ŝ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê) with an abstraction function α : S →Ŝ. Let (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) ∈Ê be a transition of a counterexampleσ. Then, we define ρ split to be a function that maps A, α, and (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) ∈Ê onto both an abstract model A = (Ŝ ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê ) and an abstraction function α : S →Ŝ , i.e., (A , α ) = ρ split (A, α, (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 )), defined as follows:
where α :Ŝ →Ŝ mapsŝ to itself ifŝ ∈ {ŝ reach 2 ,ŝ comp 2 }, and toŝ 2 otherwise.
Lemma 2 Let A = (Ŝ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê) be an abstract model of C = (S, S 0 , E) with abstraction function α : S →Ŝ. For a given transition (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) ∈Ê, assume that S
) is a refinement of A, i.e., A A C.
As a next step, we consider the case where the set of successors of S 1 and the set S 2 are disjoint. In this case, we can simply omit the corresponding abstract transition. 
Lemma 3 Let A = (Ŝ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê) be an abstract model of C = (S, S 0 , E) with the abstraction function α : S →Ŝ. For a given transition (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) ∈Ê, assume that S
Based on these results, we now present a more specific formulation of the CEGAR algorithm in Fig. 2 , called INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR, which uses the functions ρ split and ρ purge for refinement. 
ALGORITHM: INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR
Generateσ by model checking of A wrtB ENDIF ENDDO Terminate with "B not reachable" Correctness of the algorithm is implied by the following lemma. 1 Note that termination of the algorithm cannot be guaranteed as the number of states in the concrete model may be infinite, and a finite abstract model to verify (or disprove) the given property may not exist [14] .
Lemma 4
If the algorithm terminates with "B reachable", then C | = AG¬B, and if the algorithm terminates with "B not reachable", then C |= AG¬B.
The proposed procedure of validating counterexamples and refining abstract models is based on the computation of successor states. Alternatively, one could formulate a similar algorithm that uses sets of predecessors, or even a combination of both as presented in [1] and [10] .
The INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR algorithm in Fig. 2 is based on the assumption that sets of successor states are exactly computable. Unfortunately, this rarely occurs in practice for hybrid systems, and one must settle for an over-approximation succ to the successor function succ. In this case, the counterexample validation step may become overly conservative, in that the algorithm may fail to refute a spurious counterexample. 2 On the other hand, we have:
Lemma 5
If the INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR algorithm using over-approximations in computing successor states terminates with "B not reachable", then C |= AG¬B.
Example
Let us borrow Hofstadter's "MU-puzzle" [15] to illustrate the salient issues at hand. The MIU-system is a simple rewrite system over alphabet Σ = {M, I, U}, with initial string MI, and production rules
where x, y ∈ Σ * are arbitrary finite strings, and string concatenation is denoted as simple juxtaposition. For example, from the initial string MI, one can derive the new string MIU through an application of Rule 1.
The MU-puzzle asks whether this rewrite system can ever derive the string MU.
We model this as a safety property over an infinite transition system C = (S, S 0 , E), as follows. Let S = Σ * , S 0 = {MI}, and
Let B = {MU}. It is clear that C AG¬B if and only if the MU-puzzle cannot be solved, in other words if the string MU cannot be derived in the MIU-system. 1 The proofs of all lemmas in the paper can be found in the appendix. 2 We discuss this point in greater detail in the next section.
The abstract models of C that we shall consider 'lump together' states (i.e., Σ-strings) of S. The first step is to choose an initial abstract model. The only obligatory requirement is that this model should separate the initial state(s) from the bad state(s). An additional desirable property of the initial partition is that it should also be reasonably coarse, so as to minimize the number of abstract states and correspondingly allow for efficient model checking.
Let us first introduce some auxiliary definitions. For x ∈ Σ * , let I x represent the number of times the symbol I appears in x, modulo 3. Next, for j = 0, 1, 2, let S ≡j = {s ∈ S | I s = j}. Our initial abstract model is
, where S ≡0,2 = S ≡0 ∪ S ≡2 and the transition relation E 1 is depicted below:
We now observe that A 1 AG¬B 1 since there is a path (consisting of a single transition) from the initial state S ≡1 to the bad state S ≡0,2 ∈ B 1 . However, upon validation over the concrete system C, we find that this counterexample is in fact spurious, since the only one-step transitions from the single initial state MI ∈ S 0 are MI −→ MIU (as per Rule 1) and MI −→ MII (Rule 2). In other words, MU ∈ B is not reachable in one step.
We must now refine our initial abstraction in such a way as to exclude this counterexample. As discussed above, we would normally base our next refinement on the successor function succ. Unfortunately, not only is succ(S ≡1 ) difficult to compute, but in fact it turns out that iterating the refinement-counterexample-validation cycle with succ would never terminate, and thus would never allow us to decide whether C AG¬B or not.
Fortunately, we are able to rely on an over-approximation succ of the successor states:
Glancing at the production Rules 1-4, it is clear that succ is indeed an over-approximation of succ; for example, Rule 3 removes three I's from one term to the next (and therefore leaves the same number of I's modulo 3), whereas Rule 2 doubles the number of I's of a term.
Applying INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR leads to the second abstraction
where E 2 is depicted below:
The abstraction function α 2 : S → {S ≡0 , S ≡1 , S ≡2 } takes s ∈ S to S ≡ I s . We have split the previous abstract state S ≡0,2 into the two states S ≡0 and S ≡2 , and updated our transition relation accordingly. Our set of abstract bad states is now B 2 = α 2 (B) = α 2 ({MU}) = {S ≡0 }. We observe straightaway that A 2 AG¬B 2 . Lemma 5 then implies that A AG¬B, and hence that the MIU-system cannot derive the string MU.
In general, there are no hard and fast rules to decide on an initial abstraction or a suitable over-approximation to the successor function. As this example demonstrates, these choices may require a good deal of insight. However, we show in Section 5 that for hybrid systems one can find effective heuristics to derive candidate initial abstractions and successor functions.
Hybrid Systems
Hybrid systems are a class of infinite state systems that include both continuous and discrete state variables. This section presents the syntax and semantics of hybrid automata, which are used to model hybrid systems. We will illustrate these definitions with an example that models a simple car controller. The same example will be used in later sections to illustrate the CEGAR approach to the verification of hybrid systems.
Definition of Hybrid Automata

Definition 8 Syntax of the Hybrid Automaton
• Z is a finite set of locations with an initial location z 0 ∈ Z.
• X ⊆ R n is the continuous state space.
• inv : Z → 2 X assigns to each location z ∈ Z an invariant of the form inv (z) ⊆ X.
• X 0 ⊆ X is the set of initial continuous states. The set of initial hybrid states of HA is thus given by the set of states {z 0 } × X 0 .
• T ⊆ Z × Z is the set of discrete transitions between locations.
• g :
• j : T × X → 2 X assigns to each pair (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ T and x ∈ g((z 1 , z 2 )) a jump set j((z 1 , z 2 ), x) ⊆ X.
• f : Z → (X → R n ) assigns to each location z ∈ Z a continuous vector field f (z). We use the notation f z for f (z). The evolution of the continuous behavior in location z is governed by the differential equationχ(t) = f z (χ(t)). We assume that the differential equation has a unique solution for each initial value χ(0) ∈ inv (z).
The semantics of HA is defined by means of a trace transition system. Each state (z, x) in the trace transition system corresponds to a continuous state x within location z. Two such states, (z 1 , x 1 ) and (z 2 , x 2 ), are connected by a transition in the trace transition system if and only if state (z 2 , x 2 ) can be reached from state (z 1 , x 1 ) by a continuous evolution within location z 1 followed by a discrete transition to location z 2 .
Definition 9
Semantics of the Hybrid Automaton HA. The semantics of a hybrid automaton HA is a transition system TTS = (S, S 0 , E) with:
• the set of all hybrid states (z, x) of HA,
• the set of initial hybrid states
A path σ = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m ) of TTS is called a trace of HA, and we refer to TTS as the trace transition system of HA.
Definition 10 Safety of a Hybrid Automaton. For a hybrid automaton HA with a semantics as in Defn. 9, let z b ∈ Z \{z 0 } denote an unsafe location. HA is said to be safe with respect to z b , denoted by TTS | = AG¬z b iff for all traces σ there is no s ∈ σ with s = (z b , x) for some x ∈ X. We write TTS | = AG¬z b otherwise.
The extension of the analysis task to multiple initial locations and/or multiple unsafe locations is straightforward but is omitted here for simplicity.
Example
As a motivating example, we consider a simple controller that steers a car along a straight road. The car is assumed to drive at a constant speed r = 2, and its motion is modeled by the distance x from the middle of the road (x = 0 corresponds to the middle) and the heading angle γ (γ = 0 corresponds to moving straight ahead). Fig. 3 shows a scenario in which the car is initially on the road. The controller is able to detect whether the car is on the left or right border (i.e. x ≤ −1, x ≥ 1). Whenever the car enters the left border, the controller forces it to turn right until the car is back on the road again. Then a left turn is initiated, and continued until the car is again going straight ahead in the direction of the road, i.e. when the heading is aligned with the road (γ = 0). A similar strategy is employed when the car enters the right border. Figure 3 : i) Initially, the car drives on the road with heading angle γ. ii) If the controller detects that the car has left the road, it corrects the heading by turning right to avoid the canal. iii) Once the car is back on the road, a left turn is initiated until the car moves straight again. Fig. 4 shows a hybrid automaton model for this example. Besides the position x and the heading angle γ, the description includes an internal timer c, that the controller uses to time the steering manoeuvres. The differential equations for these three continous variables depend on the location: we haveẋ = −r · sin(γ) in all locations except in canal. The derivative of γ varies when a border is reached. On the border the motion of the car describes an arc with the angular velocityγ = −ω = −π/4 (or ω = π/4 respectively), i.e., the arc is part of a circle with radius r/ω. The timer c measures the time period which the car spends on the border. In the correction modes the timer decreases with double rate, i.e., the correction takes half the time as that spent previously by the car on the border. Since the sign ofγ is reversed when the car moves back on the road, the angle has the value zero when the correction mode is left (c = 0), i.e., the car then moves along the road. During this correction it might, however, happen that the other border is reached, which means that the controller then switches to the strategy of the corresponding location.
The three continuous variables are initialized to −1 ≤ x ≤ 1 (the car is on the road), −π/4 ≤ γ ≤ π/4, and c = 0. It has to be verified for this set of initial states whether the given control strategy guarantees that the unsafe location in canal (z b ) is never reached. The following sections explain how this task can be solved by abstraction-based and counterexample-guided verification. 
Refinement of Abstractions for Hybrid Systems
This section applies the general concepts of Section 3 to hybrid systems. We present specific solutions for the two crucial steps in INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR, validation and refinement. The key to the validation step is the computation of successor states for a given set of states in the trace transition system. Starting from the initial set, the validation procedure computes the successors along the counterexample until either the unsafe location z b is reached or a transition is determined to be spurious. The computation of sets of successor states is usually the most expensive step in hybrid system verification. Successor sets can be computed and represented exactly only for certain sub-classes of hybrid systems [16, 17] . However, several approaches to over-approximate successor sets have been published, as e.g., successor set approximations by hyper-rectangles [18] , general polyhedra [19] , projections to lower dimensional polyhedra [20] , or ellipsoids [21] . Most of these approaches aim at providing an efficient way to obtain conservative but tight approximations to sets of reachable states for hybrid systems.
We note that the main difficulties introduced by hybrid systems-as opposed to finitestate or discrete infinite-state systems such as the MIU-system-originate from the fact that the transition relation for hybrid systems is implicit, derived from differential equations which in general do not even have analytical solutions. Even when analytical solutions are available, the representation and computation of successor sets is non-trivial, making it difficult to manufacture reasonably tight over-approximations to the successor function. Consequently, given an abstraction function, one has to construct the transition relation by focusing on one transition at a time in the abstract system. By contrast, in the finitestate and discrete infinite-state cases, one can usually define the transition relation for an abstraction function globally-many transitions can be constructed simultaneously.
The verification framework presented here can include different techniques to overapproximate the set of successors. The idea of using different methods is motivated by the trade-off between the accuracy and the computational complexity of different methods. If, e.g., a faster but maybe less accurate technique is sufficient to refute a counterexample, then there is no need to use a more computationally expensive method.
In the following, we first describe how an initial abstraction for a hybrid automaton can be obtained, and then focus on the validation of counterexamples and refinement of abstract models based on the use of different methods for computing successor states.
Abstraction of Hybrid Systems
For the first step of the INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR algorithm, the construction of an initial abstraction, we introduce one abstract state for each location of HA. This means that two hybrid states (z i , x i ) and (z j , x j ) of TTS are mapped to the same abstract state if and only if z i = z j . This rule applies for all but the initial location, for which we introduce one abstract stateŝ 0 to represent all initial hybrid states of TTS , and another one (ŝ 0 ) to represent the remaining hybrid states corresponding to the location z 0 : Definition 11 Initial Abstraction of Hybrid Systems. Given a hybrid automaton HA with Z = {z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z nz }, let S denote the set of hybrid states as defined in (1). For i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n z }, we define the abstraction function α : S →Ŝ by:
and the initial abstract model A = (Ŝ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê) is defined by (i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n z }):
The initial abstract model represents the discrete structure of the hybrid system without regard to the continuous dynamics and guards. Given this definition, it has to be shown that A is indeed an abstract model of the underlying trace transition system, i.e., that it fulfills Defn. 2:
Lemma 6 For HA with trace transition system TTS = (S, S 0 , E), let A = (Ŝ,Ŝ 0 ,Ê) denote the initial abstract model for TTS . Then, A TTS . Fig. 5 depicts the initial abstract model of the hybrid system in Fig. 4 . It is a copy of the discrete part of the hybrid system, except that the initial location is divided into two parts:ŝ 0 represents the states in location go ahead with x ∈ [−1, 1], γ ∈ [−π/4, π/4] and c = 0, andŝ 0 all other states in go ahead. The abstract statesŝ 1 toŝ 6 represent the hybrid states of the other locations (left border, right border, correct left, correct right, straight ahead and in canal, respectively). 
Example (cont.)
Over-approximation of the Sets of Successors
We now turn to the question of computing sets of successor states, as required in the validation and refinement steps. The goal is to use different over-approximations with different precisions and different computational requirements. For technical reasons it is convenient to define succ in terms of pairs S 1 , S 2 ⊆ S, where S 1 is a set of source states and S 2 is a set of potential successor states. succ(S 1 , S 2 ) is a conservative approximation of those sucessors of states in S 1 that lie in S 2 .
Definition 12
Over-approximation of successor states. Let HA be a hybrid automaton with the trace transition system TTS = (S, S 0 , E), and let A and α be defined as in Defn. 11. For a transition (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) ∈Ê of A, we call S 1 := α −1 (ŝ 1 ) the set of hybrid source states and S 2 := α −1 (ŝ 2 ) the set of potential hybrid successor states. Then succ : (2 S × 2 S ) → 2 S is an over-approximation of the hybrid successor states in S 2 iff the following holds:
A possible explicit realization of the operator succ with respect to a given set S 2 combines the following steps: (a) By approximating the continuous evolution for all states in S 1 , the reachable subset of the guard set g(t) is determined, where t = (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ T is the transition of HA that corresponds to the transition (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 ) ∈Ê of A. Usually, this step is the most costly of the whole verification procedure; (b) the jump function j(t, x) is applied to all hybrid states (z 1 , x) which are in the reachable subset of g(t); (c) the image of j(t, x) is intersected with the set S 2 of potential hybrid successor states.
Example (cont.) Our prototype implementation uses two different methods, succ coarse and succ tight , to over-approximate the set of successor states. Fig. 6 illustrates these two methods for the discrete transition from correct right to left border. For location correct right we choose S 1 as subset of the plane x = 1, and S 2 as all states of location left border that satisfy the invariant −2 ≤ x ≤ −1. trajectory that starts in S 1 and ends in S 2 without leaving the invariant of correct right (−1 ≤ x ≤ 1 ∧ c ≥ 0). Fig. 6 (i) depicts a number of trajectories that start in S 1 , none of which reach S 2 .
The first method succ coarse poses the existence question for a trajectory between S 1 and S 2 as an optimization problem. The distance between a trajectory and S 2 is defined as the minimum distance between all points on the trajectory and S 2 . If the global minimum over all trajectories that start in S 1 is strictly greater than zero, then no successor state of S 1 exists in S 2 . In this case succ coarse (S 1 , S 2 ) returns an empty set. If the minimum distance is zero, at least one corresponding concrete path exists, and succ coarse (S 1 , S 2 ) returns the entire set S 2 as an over-approximation of the set of successor states. The bold trajectory in Fig. 6 (i) is the optimal trajectory. Its distance to S 2 is greater than zero, and there is hence no trajectory from S 1 to S 2 .
The second method succ tight computes polyhedra that enclose all trajectories that originate in S 1 . This over-approximation with polyhedra is based on work presented in [19] . The set of successor states succ tight (S 1 , S 2 ) is then obtained by intersecting the polyhedra with S 2 . Fig. 6 (ii) shows that this intersection is empty, i.e. there are no successors of S 1 in S 2 .
Validation and Refinement
The INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR algorithm makes a clear distinction between the validation of a counterexample, and the refinement of the abstract model. For hybrid systems, we propose a slightly different approach, in which the steps of validation and refinement are interleaved. We assume to have a set of over-approximation techniques succ 1 , . . . , succ n that can (but not necessarily need to) establish a hierarchy of coarse to tight approximations.
The proposed algorithm for the combined validation and refinement steps of a counterexample is shown in Fig. 7 . Let σ = (ŝ 0 , . . . ,ŝ m ) denote a counterexample of the abstract model A. The algorithm consists of two nested loops. The outer loop corresponds to checking each transition of the counterexample. The inner loop applies each of the overapproximation techniques to the current transition of the counterexample, and, depending on the result, one of the two refinement operations is executed: If an over-approximation technique succ l reveals that the current transition is spurious, i.e. S reach k = ∅, then the transition is removed from the abstract model by ρ purge . When a transition is removed, the set of behaviors of A does not include the current counterexample anymore, and thus the combined validation and refinement of the current counterexample is completed. There is some freedom in combining the steps of validation and refinement, i.e., the scheme in Fig. 7 is just one possible implementation. One interesting alternative is to apply the coarsest method for validation first to all transitions in the abstract counterexample, or to apply state splitting (ρ split ) only based on the result of the most accurate approximation method succ n .
The algorithm as proposed in Fig. 7 has two possible outcomes: either it is proved that a forbidden state cannot be reached or that there exists a counterexample that cannot be refuted. Since the validation procedure relies on over-approximations, it cannot be guaranteed that this abstract counterexample corresponds to a concrete one. In this case, under-approximations of sets of successor states can possibly be used to prove that a counterexample exists: Assume that the procedure terminates with a counterexample σ = (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 1 , . . . ,ŝ k , . . . , s m ), no transition of which could be refuted. Similarly to Defn. 12, we can define an under-approximation of successor states S
guaranteed to contain only true successors of S reach k−1 . If this operator is applied along the counterexample (from k = 1 to k = m) and S reach n = ∅, there exists at least one path for the hybrid system which violates the safety property.
As noted earlier, when using over-approximations, there is no guarantee that a spurious counterexample can be refuted. The likelihood of refuting spurious counterexamples can be increased, however, by using tighter polyhedral approximations. When the overapproximations are tight, the presence of an unrefuted yet spurious counterexample is indicative of a very slim error margin separating the reachable states from the bad ones. We would argue that when an unrefuted spurious counterexample is encountered, it may be better to redesign the implementation of our hybrid system so as to increase the error margin, rather than risk facing an actual failure in a real-world implementation of this system. If we compare the verification algorithm for hybrid systems presented here to similar approaches in the literature such as [9] , we note that the main advantage of our method is that, in relying on spurious counterexamples to refine our successive abstract models, we are focusing on the local properties of our system that are relevant to establish or invalidate a particular specification. This leaves us free, for instance, to employ cheap gross overapproximations of successor states in irrelevant areas of the hybrid system.
Example (cont.)
The requirement that the hybrid model in Fig. 4 should never enter the location in canal translates into the reachability question for stateŝ 6 of the abstract model in Fig. 5 . The first counterexample for the initial abstract model is σ 1 = (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 1 ,ŝ 6 ) (see Fig. 8 (i) ). The validation procedure considers first the transition (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 1 ) which corresponds to the transition between go ahead and left border in the hybrid automaton. As a first step, succ coarse (S 0 , α −1 (ŝ 1 )) is computed with the result that the minimum distance over all initial states is zero. This is obvious from the fact that those states of the initial set for which x = −1 enable the transition guard immediately. Thus, succ coarse returns the entire invariant of location left border as set S 2 . The next step is to compute S reach 2 = succ tight (S 0 , α −1 (ŝ 1 )). The algorithm then splitsŝ 1 so thatŝ 1 represents the set S reach 2
, and the new abstract stateŝ 1 represents S 2 \ S reach 2 ( Fig. 8 (ii) ). Since the counterexample has not been eliminated yet, the transition (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 6 ) is considered next. Method succ coarse finds that the minimal distance between the trajectories that start in S reach 2 and the guard x = −2 is greater than zero. This means that no trajectory reaches the guard, and the corresponding transition is removed (Fig. 8 (iii) ).
The procedure continues with the next counterexample σ 2 = (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 2 ,ŝ 4 ,ŝ 1 ,ŝ 6 ), as
(ii) (iii) Figure 9 : Validation an refinement of fragments illustrated for a counterexample of the car steering problem.
depicted in Fig. 8 (iv) . As for the first counterexample, the abstract stateŝ 2 is split into the states that are reachable from the initial set S 0 , and the remainder (Fig. 8 (v) ). Then, the procedure moves forward one transition and splits stateŝ 4 as a result of applying succ tight . The reachable part is represented byŝ 4 in Fig. 8 (vi) . Method succ coarse then finds that one cannot reach any state that is represented byŝ 1 from this set, and the transition (ŝ 4 ,ŝ 1 ) can be deleted from A (Fig. 8 (vii) ). The final counterexample is σ 3 = (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 1 ,ŝ 3 ,ŝ 2 ,ŝ 4 ,ŝ 1 ,ŝ 6 ). The stateŝ 1 was already split for the first counterexample. Similarly to the procedure for the counterexample σ 2 , abstract stateŝ 3 is split as depicted in Fig. 8 (viii) . It can then be shown that transition (ŝ 3 ,ŝ 2 ) is spurious, which eliminates the last counterexample ( Fig. 8 (ix) ). Consequently, the abstract stateŝ 6 is not reachable, and thus the same applies for the location in canal of the hybrid automaton.
Validation and Refinement of Fragments of Counterexamples
The initial abstraction of the example in Fig. 5 contains only two counterexamples without cycles, (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 1 ,ŝ 6 ) and (ŝ 0 ,ŝ 2 ,ŝ 4 ,ŝ 1 ,ŝ 6 ). However, to show that no bad state is reachable, three counterexamples in the series of abstractions were considered and refuted (cf. Fig. 8) . Hence, refining an abstract model, to eliminate a particular counterexample, may introduce new counterexamples. In this subsection we show that considering fragments of counterexamples, rather than complete counterexamples, can reduce the total number of counterexample that have to be considered. This often results in a significant speed-up of the verification process.
The main reason for considering fragments is as follows. The validation and refinement routine that we presented in the previous subsection typically refutes a counterexample (indeed, when a counterexample is not refuted, the algorithm stops). The counterexample refutation case can be made more efficient by the following observation. In the previous subsection, a (spurious) counterexample (ŝ 0 , . . . ,ŝ m ) is refuted by showing that no corresponding concrete path (s 0 , . . . , s m ) exists. Interestingly, showing that any one of the transitions (ŝ i ,ŝ i+1 ) in the counterexample is spurious is a sufficient condition for the nonexistence of a corresponding concrete path.
Alternatively, we can also conclude that a counterexample is spurious if one of the fragments (ŝ i ,ŝ i+1 ,ŝ i+2 ) is spurious, in other words if there is no corresponding concrete path (s i , s i+1 , s i+2 ) in the concrete model. In general, one can define spurious fragments of length n. Validation and refinement of such fragments of counterexamples can be done in a similar way as for complete counterexamples.
We now illustrate that validation and refinement of short fragments can increase the efficiency of the verification process. Clearly, if one can refute a fragment of a counterexample, e.g., a single transition, then the entire counterexample is spurious. If a counterexample can be refuted by considering a fragment of length n, it can surely be refuted by considering fragments of length n + 1. However, using a fragment of length n + 1 may have the undesirable side-effect of introducing new counterexamples, or at least more counterexamples than the method based on fragments of length n.
Example (cont.) Consider as an example Fig. 9 (i) , which depicts part of the abstract model in Fig. 8 (iv) and contains the counterexample. Note that there is a loop that enters the counterexample atŝ 2 and leaves it atŝ 4 . For this car steering example it can be shown that the fragment (ŝ 2 ,ŝ 4 ,ŝ 1 ) is spurious, even though neither of the transitions is spurious on its own. This means that validation and refinement of fragments of length 2 removes the counterexample as depicted in Fig. 9 (ii).
If we consider the complete counterexample instead, we also find that the counterexample is spurious. But in this case we would also splitŝ 2 , which introduces an additional counterexample that exploits the loop, as shown in Fig. 9(iii) . In general, whenever we split all abstract states between the entry and exit points of a loop, it will 'open' the loop, and inevitably create an additional counterexample.
There is little choice if these states have to be split to refute the counterexample. Consider for instance the first counterexample in Fig. 8 (i) . This counterexample can only be eliminated by splittingŝ 1 . But if it is possible to refute a short fragment, rather than a long one, this should be preferred. If we apply validation and refinement to fragments of length 2 of the counterexample in Fig. 8 (iv) , we are guaranteed that it will not introduce new counterexamples. If it then succeeds, we can be sure that the number of counterexamples decreases. In this particular case, refuting fragment (ŝ 2 ,ŝ 4 ,ŝ 1 ) eliminates all other counterexamples, as they also include this fragment.
Experimental Results
Experimental results for a prototype implementation of the procedure indicate its advantages over existing methods. We apply the prototype first to the car steering example that was discussed throughout this paper. Then a larger and more challenging example on an adaptive cruise control system that was put forward in the MoBIES project [22] is discussed.
Car Steering Example
For the car steering example we take as baseline INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR as described in Subsection 5.3 with the only successor operator succ tight . We refer to this method as INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-I. For the car steering example this method computes the same number of succ tight operations as a breadth-first application of the successor operator. Breadth-first application is the most prevalent method used for model checking hybrid systems.
We compare this method with two other instances of INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR. INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-II refines and validates complete counterexamples using the two different methods, as described in Subsection 5.3. The third instance INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-III first validates single transitions using succ coarse . Next, it considers fragments of length 2, using succ coarse . Finally, the third validation and refinement scheme considers fragments of length 2, but uses succ tight for the first transition, and succ coarse for the second. If these three schemes fail to refute the counterexample, the complete counterexample is considered, using the same routine as the second instance of INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR.
For the car steering example the following results are obtained when run on a Pentium 4, 1.4GHz. INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-I considers three counterexamples, computes succ tight five times, and takes 117 seconds to verify that the car steering example is safe. INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-II considers the same counterexamples but computes succ tight only three times, and finishes in 70 seconds. INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-III considers only two counterexamples, and computes succ tight only once. Since, this particular successor was easy to compute, the overall time drops to 10 seconds.
MoBIES Adaptive Cruise Control System
The model that we use for the adaptive control experiments is based on a Simulink/ adaptive cruise control is part of a vehicle-to-vehicle coordination system. The part of this system that we consider comprises two modes: the cruise control mode (cc-mode) in which a car tries to keep a constant speed, and an adaptive cruise control mode (acc-mode), in which the car tries to stay a safe distance behind a vehicle ahead of it. The acc-controller switches into acc-mode whenever the distance between the car and a vehicle ahead falls below a certain threshold. This threshold depends linearly on car speed.
The system also includes an automatic transmission system with four gears. Depending on the speed of the car it will switch between the different gears. The hybrid automaton that models both the acc-controller and the automatic transmission has 8 locations for the normal operation and one additional state that is entered on collisions, when the distance between the cars is zero. Obviously, this is the location that should not be reachable. The model takes into account the distance between two cars, their relative velocity and the velocity of the following car. The differential equations that describe the continuous behavior are non-linear, mainly due to saturation; for each gear there are upper and lower bounds on the possible acceleration.
For the adaptive cruise control example the hybrid model checker CheckMate [3] is used as a baseline, since it is possible for this case study to generate a CheckMate model that exhibits the exact same behavior as our model. CheckMate takes 770 seconds to verify that the system is safe. We compare this result to our two approaches INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-II and INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-III. INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-II considers 46 counterexamples, and computes 11 times succ tight , in 450 seconds. The resulting safe abstraction has 29 states. INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR-III only considers 10 potential counterexamples, computes succ tight just once, and takes only 39 seconds. The resulting abstraction has just 15 states. Five of the counterexamples have been refuted by considering single transitions; for example, when the following car is in first gear and in acc-mode, then it cannot collide with the leading car. All other counterexamples were refuted by considering segments of length 2. For example, one such refuted counterexample corresponds to the case when the car is in third gear and switches to acc-mode-this cannot lead to a collision.
Conclusions
This paper presents a new method for using counterexamples to refine abstractions of hybrid systems. The principal alternative for verifying the safety properties considered in this paper is to compute the reachable states for the hybrid system using a breadth-first application of the successor operator succ. It is apparent that the INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR procedure can be faster than breadth-first reachability when the safety property does not hold for the concrete system, since in this case it is possible for the model checker to quickly find a true counterexample. On the other hand, if the safety property holds, refuting one counterexample may implicitly refute others. However, the INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR procedure continues until all possible counterexamples have been explored (and indeed, may not terminate), which is in some cases equivalent to the breadth-first reachability computation. Nevertheless, we have shown here that INFINITE-STATE-CEGAR offers the possibility of using multiple methods for computing approximations to the successor states.
Proof of Lemma 5. Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the corresponding case of Lemma 4 and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 6. Proof. We show that α as defined in Defn. 11 is an abstraction function. The first condition in Defn. 2 follows directly from the definition of α. To show the second condition, it must be proved that E = {(ŝ i ,ŝ j )|(z i , z j ) ∈ T } ∪ {(ŝ 0 ,ŝ j )|(z 0 , z j ) ∈ T } ∪ {(ŝ i ,ŝ 0 )|(z i , z 0 ) ∈ T } ⊇ {(ŝ i ,ŝ j )| ∃s i , s j ∈ S : (s i , s j ) ∈ E,ŝ i = α(s i ),ŝ j = α(s j )}.
Assume (s i , s j ) ∈ E, and s i = (z i , x i ) and s j = (z j , x j ) with x i , x j ∈ X and i, j = 0. Then, it follows from the definition of E in Defn. 9 that (z i , z j ) ∈ T . Thus, (ŝ i ,ŝ j ) ∈Ê. The other cases (i = 0 or j = 0) can be shown in a similar way.
